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Abstract
Ordinary repeated games do not apply to real societies where one can cheat and run away from
partners. We formulate a model of endogenous relationships which one can unilaterally end and
start with a randomly-assigned new partner with no information ﬂow. Focusing on two-person,
two-action Prisoner’s Dilemma, we show that the endogenous duration of partnerships gives
rise to a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent evolutionary stability structure from ordinary random matching
games. Monomorphic equilibria require initial trust-building, while a polymorphic equilibrium
includes early cooperators than any strategy in monomorphic equilibria and is thus more eﬃcient.
This is due to nonlinearity of average payoﬀs.
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Economic transactions are often threatened by moral hazard. Historically, many devices are
made to mitigate moral hazard, from face-to-face transactions to legal enforcement of contracts
and rights. As the transactions have become global and the age of Internet has come, such
traditional systems of moral enforcements may become less eﬀective, because of the anonymity
of trade partners and the ease of entry to and exit from transactions. We believe, however, that
such social change does not destroy beneﬁcial transactions but simply requires other forms of
moral enforcement. In this paper we analyze an evolutionary model of endogenous long-term
relationships with no information ﬂow beyond the current partner and show a hitherto not
analyzed way to discipline players to cooperate.
We consider the following model. There is a large society of homogeneous players, who are
randomly matched to play a component game if they have no partner at the beginning of a
period. The component game is a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma until either partner wants to
break up. We call this component game as “Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
(VSRPD)”. If break-up occurs, each player ﬁnds a new partner by random match and starts
another VSRPD. When a pair of players start a new relationship, it is assumed that neither
player knows the past actions of the other. Therefore, a strategy is how to play a VSRPD,
starting from a null history each time with a new partner. Many transactional relationships
ﬁt our model. Workers can shirk, quit, and ﬁnd a new employer without telling the past, and
borrowers can move to another city after defaulting and ﬁnd a new lender without telling the
true credit history.
In order to make a cooperative relationship, it is necessary to reduce the continuation payoﬀ
of a defector. Ordinary trigger strategies do not work because the punishment cannot be applied
to a defector who can run away and restart with a new partner with no information ﬂow. After a
break-up, the lifetime payoﬀ starting from a new partnership is the continuation payoﬀ, and thus
it must not be too large to deter defection. In the literature, matching friction (unemployment)
and gradual cooperation (trust building) have been introduced to lower the life-time payoﬀ and
analyzed extensively.1 These mechanisms impose low payoﬀ after a break-up or reduce initial
payoﬀ of new matches and sustain symmetric (monomorphic) cooperative equilibria.
We show that there is a third disciplining device: co-existence of diverse strategies. If there
are diﬀerent types of strategies in the population and if it is beneﬁcial to match with the same
type but not with a diﬀerent type, such polymorphic distribution sustains cooperation among
partnerships with the same type, because defection and break-up lead to a possible bad match.
1See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and Okuno-Fujiwara (1987) for unemployment as a disciplining device and
Carmichael and MacLeod (1997), Datta (1996), Ghosh and Ray (1996), Kranton (1996a) and Watson (2002) for
gradual cooperation.
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Figure 1a: Ordinary random matching
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Figure 1b: Endogenous partnerships
Moreover, a polymorphic equilibrium is more eﬃcient than any monomorphic equilibrium, since
the latter requires that everyone must build trust initially, while the former can include strategies
that start cooperating earlier. This is a substantially diﬀerent conclusion compared to those of
the random matching games.
The existence and payoﬀ superiority of a stable polymorphic equilibrium are thanks to the
nonlinearity of payoﬀs under endogenous length of the VSRPD. In the usual random matching
games, the component game’s length is exogenously ﬁxed, and therefore the payoﬀ of a strategy
is linear in the strategy-share distribution. Consider, for example, a random matching game
of a one-shot 2 by 2 coordination game. Let a and b be strategies and α be the fraction of
a-strategy in the population. The expected payoﬀ of x-strategy (x = a,b) is linear in α such
that u(x;α) = αu(x,a)+(1−α)u(x,b). A numerical example2 is displayed in Figure 1a, and we
see that the mixed-strategy equilibrium is unstable and less eﬃcient than (at least one) eﬃcient
pure equilibrium.
In our model, however, the duration of VSRPD is endogenous. If there are diﬀerent strategies
in the population and only a match with the same strategy would last, then the lifetime average
payoﬀ becomes nonlinear, which can be intuitively explained as follows. Let c0 and c1 be
strategies and α be the fraction of c0-strategy in the population. Assume that if the same
strategies are matched, the partnership continues as long as they both live (with probability δ2
in each period), and a c0-pair earns higher payoﬀ within the match than a c1-pair. However,
if diﬀerent strategies are matched, c1-strategy exploits c0-strategy and the partnership ends
immediately. Let the per period average payoﬀ of ct strategy within a match with ct0-strategy
be v(ct,ct0).
The lifetime average payoﬀ of each strategy before knowing the new partner is the total
2Based on u(a,a) = 60 > u(b,b) = 40, u(a,b) = 30, and u(b,a) = 50.
2expected payoﬀ divided by the total expected duration of matches;3
v(c0;α) =
α 1
1−δ2v(c0,c0) + (1 − α) · 1 · v(c0,c1)
α 1
1−δ2 + (1 − α) · 1
,
v(c1;α) =
α · 1 · v(c1,c0) + (1 − α) 1
1−δ2v(c1,c1)
α · 1 + (1 − α) 1
1−δ2
.
Therefore they are non-linear in α. A numerical example is depicted in Figure 1b.
Moreover, we can show that the “victim” c0-strategy has a concave lifetime average payoﬀ
and the exploiter c1-strategy has a convex lifetime average payoﬀ as follows. Consider the eﬀect
of decrease of α from 1 to 0 on the average payoﬀ of c0-strategy. As the share of c1-strategy
increases, c0-strategy gets exploited more often, and thus its payoﬀ decreases. Moreover, this
payoﬀ decrease accelerates as α decreases, because (i) partnership dissolutions due to mismatch
occur more often, (ii) thus c0-strategy goes into the matching pool more often, and (iii) hence
c0-strategy meets c1-strategy more often. Therefore the average payoﬀ of c0-strategy is concave
in α, as in Figure 1b.
Similarly, as α increases from 0 to 1, the average payoﬀ of c1-strategy increases because
the share of victims increases. Moreover, the payoﬀ is convex in α, since the matching rate with
the victims in its lifetime increases more as α increases, thanks to more frequent dissolution
of partnerships. In this way, the endogenous duration of partnerships implies convex/concave
payoﬀ functions, which was not the case in ordinary random matching games.
The nonlinear payoﬀ structure gives rise to a substantially diﬀerent stability of strategy
distributions from the ordinary random matching games. In Figure 1b, there are two stable
equilibria; the monomorphic equilibrium of c1 (α = 0) and the bimorphic equilibrium where
α ≈ 0.88. The middle Nash equilibrium where α ≈ 0.5 is not stable. Furthermore, since both
payoﬀ functions are increasing in the share of c0-strategy, the bimorphic equilibrium with a
large share of c0-strategy is more eﬃcient than the most eﬃcient monomorphic equilibrium,
consisting only of c1-strategy. (The monomorphic distribution of c0-strategy where α = 1 does
not constitute even a Nash equilibrium.)
This evolutionary stability of polymorphic distributions in a homogeneous population pro-
vides a foundation of incomplete information models such as Ghosh and Ray (1997) and Rob
and Yang (2005), because it illustrates that diﬀerent “types” of strategies may appear sponta-
neously through evolutionary processes even if all players have the same characteristics (stage
game payoﬀ function, information structure, and matching probabilities). In a bargaining con-
text, Abreu and Sethi (2003) have a similar motivation to ours to endogenize multiple behavior
rules through evolution. Their focus is to derive co-existence of rational and behavioral players,
while we give co-existence of diﬀerent strategies among homogeneous players.
3See Section 2.2 for details.
3P1 \ P2 C D
C c, c `, g
D g, ` d, d
Table 1: Payoﬀ of Prisoner’s Dilemma
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the formal model and stability
concepts. In Section 3, we show various neutrally stable strategy distributions and that more
diversity implies higher equilibrium payoﬀ. In Section 4 we discuss extensions, and in Section 5
we give concluding remarks.
2 Model and Stability Concepts
2.1 Model
Consider a society with a continuum of players. Each player may die in each period 1,2,...
with probability 0 < (1 − δ) < 1. When players die, they are replaced by newborn players,
keeping the total population constant. Newborn players and players who do not have a partner
enter into the matching pool where players are randomly paired to play the following Voluntarily
Separable Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (VSRPD).
In each period, matched players play ordinary two-person, two-action Prisoner’s Dilemma,
whose actions are denoted as Cooperate and Defect. After observing the play action proﬁle of
the period, they choose simultaneously whether or not they want to keep the match into the
next period (action k) or bring it to an end (action e). Unless both choose k, the match is
dissolved and players will have to start the next period in the matching pool. In addition, even
if they both choose k, one’s partner may die with probability 1 − δ which forces the surviving
player to go back to the matching pool next period. If both choose k and survive to the next
period, then the match continues, and the partners play Prisoner’s Dilemma again.
Assume that there is limited information available to play VSRPD. In each period, players
know the history of their current match but have no knowledge about the history of other
matches in the society.
In each match, a proﬁle of play actions by the partners determines their one-shot payoﬀs.
We denote the payoﬀs associated with each play action proﬁle as4: u(C,C) = c, u(C,D) = `,
u(D,C) = g, u(D,D) = d with the ordering g > c > d > ` and5 2c = g + `. (See Table 1.)
We assume that the innate discount rate is zero except for the possibility of death, hence
4The ﬁrst coordinate is your own action.
5The assumption 2c = g + ` is to simplify the analysis by making the symmetric action proﬁle (C,C) most
eﬃcient. It is possible to construct equilibria to play (C,D) and (D,C) alternatingly when 2c < g+`. See Section
4.2.
4each player ﬁnds the relevant discount factor to be δ ∈ (0,1). With this, lifetime payoﬀ for each
player is well-deﬁned given his own strategy (for VSRPD) and the strategy distribution in the
matching pool population over time.
Let t = 1,2,... indicate the periods in a match, not the calendar time in the game. Under
the no-information-ﬂow assumption, we focus on match-independent strategies that only depend
on t and the private history of actions in the Prisoner’s Dilemma within a match.6 Let Ht :=
{C,D}2(t−1) be the set of partnership histories at the beginning of t = 2 and let H1 := {∅}.
Deﬁnition: A pure strategy s of VSRPD consists of (xt,yt)∞
t=1 where:
xt : Ht → {C,D} speciﬁes an action choice xt(ht) ∈ {C,D} given the partnership history
ht ∈ Ht, and
yt : Ht × {C,D}2 → {k,e} speciﬁes whether to keep or end the partnership, depending on the
partnership history ht ∈ Ht and the current period action proﬁle.
The set of pure strategies of VSRPD is denoted as S and the set of all strategy distributions
in the population is denoted as P(S). We assume that each player uses a pure strategy, which
is natural in an evolutionary game and simpliﬁes the analysis.
We investigate the evolutionary stability of stationary strategy distributions in the match-
ing pool. Although the strategy distribution in the matching pool may be diﬀerent from the
distribution in the entire society, if the former is stationary, the distribution of various states of
matches is also stationary, thanks to the stationary death process.7
In addition to the stability of social states, stationarity in the matching pool allows us
to compute the lifetime payoﬀ of each strategy explicitly, because it becomes recursive. (See
equation (1) in the next subsection.)
2.2 Lifetime and Average Payoﬀ
When a strategy s ∈ S is matched with another strategy s0 ∈ S, the expected length of the
match is denoted as L(s,s0) and is computed as follows. Notice that even if s and s0 intend to
6The continuation decision is observable, but strategies cannot vary depending on combinations of {k,e} since
only (k,k) will lead to the future choice of actions. It is also possible to allow strategies to depend on a player’s
personal history, like Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994). However, the cooperation using “contagion of defection”
in their models does not hold in our model of continuum of players.
7To explain, let a social state be the distribution of strategy pairs in the society classiﬁed according to the
“planned length” of the pair, i.e., when the pair intends to end the partnership if no death occurs, in a VSRPD.
A social state is determined by in-ﬂows from matching pool and out-ﬂows by the random death and the time
that passes. If the strategy distribution in the matching pool is stationary, the distribution of newly formed
strategy pairs are stationary. Each newly formed pair has a planned length of the partnership (possibly inﬁnite)
determined by their strategies. Let n = 1,2,3,...,∞ be all possible planned lengths of strategy pairs. Since the
random death applies to all pairs with the same probability in each period and the planned length of a partnership
becomes one period less for each pair after each period (except for n = ∞), the outﬂow from each group of pairs
with the same n is stationary, and newly formed pairs will join group n’s in a stationary manner. Therefore the
distribution of groups of pairs with the same n is stationary as well.
5maintain the match, it will only continue with probability δ2. Suppose that the planned length
of the partnership of s and s0 is T(s,s0) periods, if no death occurs. Then
L(s,s0) := 1 + δ2 + δ4 + ··· + δ2{T(s,s0)−1} =
1 − δ2T(s,s0)
1 − δ2 .
The expected total discounted value of the payoﬀ stream of s within the match with s0 is
denoted as V (s,s0). The average per period payoﬀ that s expects to receive within the match




, or V (s,s0) = L(s,s0)v(s,s0).
Next we show the structure of the lifetime and average payoﬀ of a player endowed with
strategy s ∈ S in the matching pool, waiting to be matched randomly with a partner. When a
strategy distribution in the matching pool is p ∈ P(S) and is stationary, we write the expected
total discounted value of payoﬀ streams s expects to receive during his lifetime as V (s;p) and




= (1 − δ)V (s;p),
where L = 1 + δ + δ2 + ··· = 1
1−δ is the expected lifetime of s.
Thanks to the stationary distribution in the matching pool, we can write V (s;p) as a recursive







+[δ(1 − δ){1 + δ2 + ··· + δ2{T(s,s0)−2}} + δ2{T(s,s0)−1}δ]V (s;p)
i
, (1)
where supp(p) is the support of the distribution p, the sum δ(1−δ){1+δ2 +···+δ2{T(s,s0)−2}}
is the probability that s loses the partner s0 before T(s,s0), and δ2{T(s,s0)−1}δ is the probability
that the match continued until T(s,s0) and s survives at the end of T(s,s0) and goes back to
the matching pool. Note that the stationarity of p implies that the continuation payoﬀ is always
V (s;p) after a match ends for any reason.
Let L(s;p) :=
P


























6where the ratio L(s,s0)/L(s;p) is the relative length of periods that s expects to spend in a match
with s0. As noted in the Introduction, this nonlinearity is due to the endogenous duration of
partnerships. Note also that, if p is a strategy distribution consisting of a single strategy s0,
then v(s;p) = v(s,s0).
2.3 Nash Equilibrium
Deﬁnition: Given a stationary strategy distribution in the matching pool p ∈ P(S), s ∈ S is
a best reply against p if for all s0 ∈ S,
v(s;p) = v(s0;p),
and is denoted as s ∈ BR(p).
Deﬁnition: A stationary strategy distribution in the matching pool p ∈ P(S) is a Nash equi-
librium if, for all s ∈ supp(p), s ∈ BR(p).
Lemma 1. Any strategy distribution p ∈ P(S) such that all strategies in the support start with
C in t = 1 is not a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider a myopic strategy ˜ d which plays D at t = 1 and ends the partnership for any
observation at t = 1. For t = 2, which is oﬀ-path, specify arbitrary actions. Then any ˜ d-strategy
earns g as the average payoﬀ under p, which is the maximal possible payoﬀ. I.e., ˜ d ∈ BR(p) and
s 6∈ BR(p) for all s ∈ supp(p).
Therefore, the C-trigger and C-tit-for-tat strategy of ordinary repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
cannot constitute even a Nash equilibrium. Some fraction of players must play D in the ﬁrst
period of a partnership, in any equilibrium.
By contrast, p˜ d consisting only of a “hit-and-run” ˜ d-strategy is a Nash equilibrium. Against
a ˜ d-strategy, any strategy must play one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Hence, any strategy that
starts with C in t = 1 earns strictly lower average payoﬀ than that of a ˜ d-strategy, and any
strategy that starts with D in t = 1 earns the same average payoﬀ as that of a ˜ d-strategy.
2.4 Neutral Stability
Recall that in an ordinary 2-person symmetric normal-form game G = (S,u), a (mixed) strategy
p ∈ P(S) is a Neutrally Stable Strategy if for any q ∈ P(S), there exists 0 < ¯ ²q < 1 such that
for any ² ∈ (0,¯ ²q), Eu(p,(1 − ²)p + ²q) = Eu(q,(1 − ²)p + ²q). (Maynard Smith, 1982.)
An extension of this concept to our extensive form game is to require a strategy distribution
not to be invaded by a small fraction of a mutant strategy who enters the matching pool in a
stationary manner.
7Deﬁnition: A stationary strategy distribution p ∈ P(S) in the matching pool is a Neutrally
Stable Distribution (NSD) if, for any s0 ∈ S, there exists ¯ ² ∈ (0,1) such that for any s ∈ supp(p)
and any ² ∈ (0,¯ ²),
v(s;(1 − ²)p + ²ps0) = v(s0;(1 − ²)p + ²ps0), (4)
where ps0 is the strategy distribution consisting only of s0.
If a monomorphic distribution consisting of a single strategy constitutes a NSD, the strategy
is called a Neutrally Stable Strategy (NSS). It can be easily seen that any NSD is a Nash
equilibrium.
A stronger notion of stability that requires strict inequality (which is used in the notion
of Evolutionary Stable Strategy) is too strong in our extensive-form model since any strategy
that is diﬀerent in the oﬀ-path actions from the incumbent strategies can earn the same average
payoﬀ as the incumbents’.
Similar to the ordinary “static” notion of evolutionary stability, our deﬁnition is based on the
assumption that mutation takes place rarely so that only single mutation occurs within the time
span in which a stationary strategy distribution is formed. However, unlike the ordinary notion
of neutral stability (or ESS) of one-shot games, we need to assume the expected length of the
lifetime of a mutant strategy in order to calculate its average payoﬀ. In ordinary evolutionary
games, the length of the component game is exogenously ﬁxed, and so is the length of the
lifetime of a mutant. In our model, by contrast, the length of the partnership is endogenous,
and thus there is no obvious way to deﬁne the lifetime of a mutant. Since the partnership can
potentially continue forever, we required that a stationary distribution of a mutant strategy to
be deterred. This is the strongest notion of stability, because any shorter-lived mutants can be
deterred. While we do not insist that the above deﬁnition is the best imaginable, it is tractable
and justiﬁable.
We show that any myopic ˜ d-strategy is not a NSS, even though it constitutes a monomorphic
Nash equilibrium.8 Hence NSD concept selects among Nash equilibria in our model.
Lemma 2. Any myopic ˜ d-strategy is not a NSS.
Proof: Consider the following c1-strategy.
t = 1: Play D and keep the partnership if and only if (D,D) is observed in the current period.
t = 2: Play C and keep the partnership if and only if (C,C) is observed in the current period.
8Note that repeated Defection itself can be sustained by some NSS, as later analysis shows. For example, a
strategy that always defects but keeps the partnership if and only if (D,D) is observed is a NSS.
8For any ² ∈ (0,1), let p := (1 − ²)p˜ d + ²pc1. From (3),
v(˜ d;p) = d;
v(c1;p) = (1 − ²)
L(c1, ˜ d)
L(c1;p)




since v(c1, ˜ d) = d, and v(c1,c1) = (1 − δ2)d + δ2c > d.
2.5 Trust-building Strategies
The successful invader c1-strategy generates the most eﬃcient symmetric outcome among those
that play D at least once. However, it may not constitute a symmetric Nash equilibrium if
the deviation payoﬀ g is too large and the survival rate δ is too small. We thus focus on its
generalized versions called trust-building strategies, deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition: For any T = 0,1,2,..., let a trust-building strategy with T periods of trust-building
(written as cT-strategy hereafter) be a strategy as follows:
t 5 T: Play D and keep the partnership if and only if (D,D) is observed in the current period.
t = T + 1: Play C and keep the partnership if and only if (C,C) is observed in the current
period.
The ﬁrst T periods of cT-strategy are called trust-building periods and the periods afterwards
are called cooperation periods. A trust-building strategy continues the partnership if and only
if “acceptable” action proﬁles are played, and the acceptable action proﬁle during the trust-
building periods is (D,D) only and during the cooperation periods is (C,C) only.
In this paper we are not trying to establish a folk theorem but instead we investigate how
much eﬃciency can be attained. Playing C forever after some point is desirable for eﬃciency.
Since a player can unilaterally end the partnership, ending the partnership is the maximal
punishment. Thus, the trust-building strategies are suﬃcient to look for the second best.
Needless to say, Nash equilibrium and NSD are proved by checking all other strategies in S
(not just among trust-building strategies).
3 Neutrally Stable Distributions
3.1 Monomorphic NSS
We ﬁrst consider monomorphic strategy distributions, consisting of a single cT-strategy, as
a benchmark. The literature of endogenous partnerships has focused on symmetric strategy
distributions. In the literature, multiple-action Prisoner’s Dilemma was often used and thus
gradual increase of cooperation level was feasible. In our model, there are only two actions and
thus cT-strategy can be interpreted as a “gradual cooperation” strategy.
9Let pT be the strategy distribution consisting only of cT-strategy. We ﬁrst derive a condition
on T to warrant that pT is a Nash equilibrium. By the usual logic of dynamic programming,
it suﬃces to prove that the average payoﬀ generated by one-shot deviation is not higher than
that of cT-strategy (i.e., use of a strategy that diﬀer from cT in one-step in a VSRPD, followed
by cT-strategy from the next VSRPD on, do not fare better than cT-strategy). Note that in
our model, there are two phases that one can deviate, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and in the
continuation decision phase.
It is straightforward to show that one-shot deviations to end the partnership after observing
on-path actions and one-shot deviations to play C during the trust-building periods do not
earn higher payoﬀ than cT does. Therefore it is suﬃcient to deter one-shot deviation strategies
that play D when t = T + 1. During the cooperation periods, a one-shot deviation strategy
earns g immediately but then goes back to the matching pool if he survives. Therefore, the
(non-averaged) continuation payoﬀ is
g + δV (cT;pT) = g + (L − 1)v(cT;pT).
By contrast, cT receives one-shot payoﬀ c as long as the partners survive but goes back to the
matching pool if he outlives the partner. From (2), the continuation payoﬀ is
c





1 − δ2 + {L −
1
1 − δ2}v(cT;pT).
Hence one-shot deviations during the cooperation periods of a partnership is deterred if
g + (L − 1)v(cT;pT) 5
c





δ2[c − (1 − δ2)g] =: vBR. (5)
We call (5) the Best Reply Condition for monomorphic distributions.
Since vBR is independent of the length T of trust-building periods and v(cT;pT) = v(cT,cT) =
(1 − δ2T)d + δ2Tc is a decreasing function of T, there is a lower bound to T above which (5)
is satisﬁed. To compute the lower bound explicitly, for any T, deﬁne δ(T) as the solution to





1 − δ2 .










Although δ(1) may exceed 1, δ(∞) < 1. Hence for any δ > δ(∞), there exists the minimum
length of trust building periods that warrants (5). For every δ > δ(∞), let
τ(δ) := argminτ∈R++{δ(τ) | δ = δ(τ)}.
10Then the Best Reply Condition (5) for monomorphic distributions is satisﬁed if and only if
T = τ(δ). The above argument is summarized as follows.
Proposition 1. For any δ ∈ (δ(∞),1), the monomorphic strategy distribution pT consisting
only of cT-strategy is a Nash equilibrium if and only if T = τ(δ).
Two remarks are in order. First, τ is a decreasing function of δ, since δ is decreasing in T.
Second, in the ordinary inﬁnitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, the lower bound to the discount
factor (as δ2) that sustains the trigger-strategy equilibrium is
q
g−c
g−d = δ(∞). This means that
cooperation in VSRPD requires more patience.
Next we investigate when a Nash equilibrium pT is neutrally stable, i.e., cT-strategy is a
NSS. If a mutant s0 can invade a distribution p, for any ¯ ² > 0, there exists ² ∈ (0,¯ ²) such that
v(s;(1 − ²)p + ²ps0) < v(s0;(1 − ²)p + ²ps0).
By letting ² → 0, it must be an alternative best reply to p.
There are only two kinds of strategies that are possibly alternative best replies to pT. The
obvious ones are those that diﬀer from cT-strategy oﬀ the play path. These will give the same
payoﬀ as cT-strategy and therefore cannot invade pT. The other kind is the strategies that play
D at some point when the partner is in the cooperation periods. When T > τ(δ), however, such
strategies are not alternative best replies. Therefore cT-strategy is a NSS for this case.
When τ(δ) is an integer, the Nash equilibrium pτ(δ) has alternative best replies (all one-shot
deviations during the cooperation periods), among which cτ(δ)+1 earns the highest payoﬀ when
meeting itself. It suﬃces to check if cτ(δ)+1-strategy cannot invade pτ(δ).
For any T, let pT+1
T (α) = αpT + (1 − α)pT+1 be a two-strategy distribution of cT and
cT+1. As we explained in the Introduction, the average payoﬀ of cT strategy, v(cT;pT+1
T (α)),
is strictly increasing and concave in α for any T, while the average payoﬀ of cT+1-strategy,
v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)), is strictly increasing and convex when T 5 τ(δ).
Lemma 3. For any δ ∈ (δ(∞),1) and any T = 0,1,2..., v(cT;pT+1
T (α)) is a strictly increasing
and concave function of α.
Proof: By diﬀerentiation. See Appendix.
Lemma 4. For any δ ∈ (δ(∞),1) and any T = 0,1,2... such that T 5 τ(δ), v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α))
is a strictly increasing and convex function of α.
Proof: By diﬀerentiation. See Appendix.
By the deﬁnition of τ(δ), the average payoﬀ of cτ(δ) and cτ(δ)+1-strategy coincide at α =
1. Thus, the convexity/concavity of the average payoﬀ functions implies that cτ(δ)+1-strategy











α (fraction of cT)
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Figure 2: Average payoﬀ functions of cT-strategy and cT+1-strategy when T = τ(δ)
(g = 60,c = 32,d = 0,` = −10,δ =
√
7/2
2 , and T = τ(δ) = 1.)
cannot invade pτ(δ) if and only if the slope of v(cτ(δ);p
τ(δ)+1
τ(δ) (α)) is strictly smaller than the slope
of v(cτ(δ)+1;p
τ(δ)+1
τ(δ) (α)) at α = 1. (See Figure 2.) This relationship of the slopes is warranted if
τ(δ) is not too large, because as T becomes larger, the merit of starting cooperation one period
earlier becomes smaller.


















(g − `) < c − d. (6)
Proof: By computation. See Appendix.




(g − `) = c − d. (7)
Then cτ(δ)+1-strategy cannot invade pτ(δ) if and only if τ(δ) < ˆ τ(δ). To interpret (6), notice
that L(cT,cT) = 1 + δ2 + ··· and L(cT+1,cT) = 1 + δ2 + ··· + δ2T, so that 1 − δ2(T+1) =
L(cT+1,cT)/L(cT,cT). Hence the condition (6) is equivalent to
(g − `)L(cT+1,cT) < (c − d)L(cT,cT) (8)
at T = τ(δ). The RHS of (8) can be interpreted as the relative merit of cT-strategy against
cT+1-strategy (to start cooperating one period early when meeting itself) and the LHS is the
relative merit of cT+1-strategy when meeting cT-strategy.
As δ increases, T must increase to keep the equality (7). Thus ˆ τ is a monotone increasing
function of δ. Recall that τ is a monotone decreasing function of δ. It is easy to show (see
12Figure 3 in subsection 3.2) that there is a unique δ∗ ∈ (δ(∞),1) such that
δ R δ∗ ⇐⇒ ˆ τ(δ) R τ(δ).
This δ∗ is the critical survival rate such that (6) is satisﬁed at T = τ(δ) if and only if δ > δ∗. In
summary, most of the monomorphic Nash equilibrium strategies are NSS except at boundary
values when δ < δ∗.
Proposition 2. (a) For any δ ∈ (δ∗,1), cT-strategy is a NSS if and only if T = τ(δ).
(b) For any δ ∈ (δ(∞),δ∗], cT-strategy is a NSS if and only if T > τ(δ).
It is possible to select among the monomorphic NSS’s by cheap talk, under a slightly stronger
deﬁnition of stability. The idea is that entrants can use a neologism at the beginning of a match
to distinguish themselves from incumbents, imitate incumbents if the partner was an incumbent,
and shorten trust-building periods if the partner was an entrant. If we require that entrants
must be self-sustaining, i.e., the post-entry distribution must satisfy the Best Reply Condition,
then the most eﬃcient NSS is the unique strategy that is robust against self-sustaining entrants.
3.2 Bimorphic NSD
The nonlinearity of average payoﬀ functions indicates that they may intersect when both strate-
gies are present in the population, showing the potential for a bimorphic NSD consisting of two
trust-building strategies.
Most literature on voluntarily separable repeated games has concentrated on monomorphic
equilibria so that no voluntary break-up occurs, except for sorting out inherent defectors under
incomplete information case. (See Section 5.) In this subsection we go beyond monomorphic
equilibria and show the existence of bimorphic NSD. Since our model is of complete information
and with homogeneous players, the following analysis can be interpreted as an evolutionary
foundation of incomplete information models of diverse types of behaviors.
We focus on bimorphic distributions of the form pT+1
T (α) := αpT +(1−α)pT+1 and T < τ(δ).
In order to compare eﬃciency with monomorphic NSDs, it is suﬃcient to investigate whether cT-
strategy with T < τ(δ) can be played by a positive measure of players. Against a cT-strategy,
cT+k-strategies with k = 1 behave the same way and, among those, cT+1-strategy earns the
highest payoﬀ when meeting itself. Therefore for eﬃciency analysis (which is done in the next
subsection 3.3), this class of bimorphic distributions are suﬃcient to consider.
For a bimorphic distribution to be a NSD, it needs to satisfy the following three conditions.
• All strategies in the support must earn the same average payoﬀ.
13• If the share of an incumbent strategy increases a little, its average payoﬀ should be worse
than the other strategy’s and vice versa.
Then the strategy distribution cannot be invaded by strategies that have the same play
path as that of the incumbents.
• No strategy which diﬀer in one step (on the play path) from some incumbent strategy can
invade the distribution for suﬃciently small ².
The ﬁrst two conditions can be jointly formulated as follows:
Stable Payoﬀ Equalization: there exists αT+1
T ∈ (0,1) and a neighborhood U of αT+1
T such that
for any α ∈ U
α R αT+1
T ⇐⇒ v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)) R v(cT;pT+1
T (α)). (9)
To deter invasion of mutants with one-step diﬀerent strategy on the play path, we divide the
mutants into two classes: those that play diﬀerently in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and those that
choose a diﬀerent continuation decision.
First, consider mutants who play diﬀerently in Prisoner’s Dilemma on the play path. At
t 5 T, the incumbents will play D. If a mutant plays C, it receives ` and goes back to the
matching pool, while any incumbent receives d(> `) and has less periods to build trust. Thus
any incumbent has strictly larger continuation payoﬀ than the mutant. At T + 1, any action
proﬁle can occur on the play path, so we do not have to consider mutants. At t = T + 2, the
incumbents will play C. If a mutant plays D and follows cT+k-strategy (k = 0,1) afterwards,
its continuation payoﬀ is g +(L−1)v(cT+k;pT+1
T (αT+1
T )), while cT+k itself has the continuation
payoﬀ of
c





Combining with Stable Payoﬀ Equalization, we can warrant that this type of mutants do strictly
worse than the incumbents if








T )) ∀k = 0,1,
⇐⇒ v(cT;pT+1
T (αT+1
T )) = v(cT+1;pT+1
T (αT+1
T )) < vBR. (10)
Note that if incumbents have strictly higher average payoﬀ than a mutant, even if mutants enter
with a positive measure, for suﬃciently small measure, they cannot earn higher average payoﬀ
than any of the incumbents in the post-entry distribution.
Second, consider mutants who choose a diﬀerent continuation decision on the play path.
When a symmetric action proﬁle is observed, incumbents would choose k. If a mutant ends the
partnership, it goes back to the matching pool, and thus the continuation payoﬀ is the payoﬀ
14starting from a null history, while the incumbents have at least one period less to build trust or
they are already in the cooperation periods, thus their continuation payoﬀ is strictly larger.
When an asymmetric action proﬁle is observed, incumbents would choose e. Even if a mutant
wants to keep the partnership, the outcome cannot be changed in a match with an incumbent.
In a match with another mutant, they do not observe an asymmetric action proﬁle, thus their
play path do not diﬀer from the incumbents’.
In sum, a bimorphic NSD exists if there exists αT+1
T ∈ (0,1) and its neighborhood such that
(9) is satisﬁed and at that αT+1
T , the average payoﬀ is less than vBR. For δ such that τ(δ) < ˆ τ(δ)
and T suﬃciently close to but less than τ(δ), such αT+1
T exists.
The idea of the proof is essentially that as T decreases slightly below τ(δ), the situation
changes from Figure 2 to Figure 1b. Figure 2 shows that at T = τ(δ) < ˆ τ(δ), the average
payoﬀ functions of cT and cT+1 intersect at α = 1 and at some α ∈ (0,1) thanks to the
convexity/concavity. As T decreases from τ(δ), cT+1-strategy has higher average payoﬀ than cT
at α = 1. However, since T < ˆ τ(δ) is warranted under δ > δ∗, the slope of v(cT+1;pT+1
T (1)) is
steeper than the slope of v(cT;pT+1
T (1)), and hence by continuity of the average payoﬀ functions
with respect to T, there are two intersections in (0,1), and the larger intersection satisﬁes Stable
Payoﬀ Equalization condition (9), as depicted in Figure 1b.
The strict Best Reply Condition (10) holds for any α which satisﬁes (9). If one-step deviation
after T +1 is better than following the incumbents, then it is better to deviate at T +1. However,
such strategy earns exactly the same payoﬀ as that of cT+1, which is also the same as that of
cT under the payoﬀ equalization. Therefore no one-step deviation during cooperation periods
of cT or cT+1 earns higher payoﬀ.
Proposition 3. For any δ > δ∗, there exists τ2(δ) < τ(δ) such that for any T ∈ (τ2(δ),τ(δ))9 ,
there exists a bimorphic NSD with the support {cT,cT+1}.
Proof: See Appendix.
Figure 3 illustrates the regions of (T,δ) where a monomorphic or a bimorphic NSD exist. To
warrant an integer T, we need to restrict the payoﬀ parameters G so that (τ2(δ),τ(δ)) contains
an integer. Figure 1b is based on a numerical example10 of such G that warrants a bimorphic
NSD with the support {c0,c1}, even though c0-strategy is never a NSS.
3.3 Higher Eﬃciency of Bimorphic NSD
For a given δ > δ∗, the shortest trust-building periods in the support of a bimorphic NSD is
at least one period less than any of monomorphic NSS. Let the shortest trust-building periods
9As T decreases further, the intersection becomes unique. The unique intersection does not satisfy (9). Thus
the suﬃcient range of T is an open interval.































Figure 3: Parametric summary of monomorphic NSS and bimorphic NSD
of NSS be T + 1 and consider a bimorphic NSD with the support {cT,cT+1}. Let αT+1
T be the




T (α)) is an increasing function of α,
v(cT+1;pT+1




T > 0. (See Figure 1b.) Hence bimorphic NSDs, if they exist, are more eﬃcient
than any monomorphic NSS under the same parameters, thanks to earlier cooperation, even
though equilibrium break-up occurs.
The intuition is as follows. Diverse strategies in the society make it valuable to maintain
a relationship with the same-type partner, and if it is an equilibrium, the earliest cooperators
(the “victims”) must have enough share in the population to help each other. Thus a signiﬁcant
fraction of players can start cooperation early, which is more eﬃcient than a monomorphic
distribution under which all players must build trust initially.
Eeckhout (2006) shows that there exists a correlated strategy proﬁle which Pareto domi-
nates the best symmetric equilibrium, in a similar model to ours. His idea was to introduce a
correlation device, such as skin color, to selectively start cooperation after a random match. By
contrast, we have shown that correlation is not necessary to improve eﬃciency.
163.4 Polymorphic NSD
We can extend the analysis of the bimorphic NSDs to general polymorphic NSDs with more than
two trust-building strategies in the support. However, ﬁnite-support NSDs are quite complex
to analyze, while inﬁnite-support NSDs are simpler. Let us explain this ﬁrst and then focus on
inﬁnite-support NSDs.
Let us consider a trimorphic distribution with the support {cT,cT+1,cT+2}. There are two
ways to parameterize a trimorphic distribution. One parameterization is
αpT + βpT+1 + (1 − α − β)pT+2, (11)
while another way is
αpT + (1 − α)γpT+1 + (1 − α)(1 − γ)pT+2, (12)
where γ is the relative share of cT+1 as compared to that of cT+2, given the fraction α of cT-
strategy. The parameterization (12) is easier to use, since we can decompose the Stable Payoﬀ
Equalization condition of three strategies into pairs, as follows. Given α, compare the payoﬀs
of cT+1 and cT+2. If these are equated and stability similar to (9) is satisﬁed, we can compare
the payoﬀs of cT and cT+1 (since cT+2 earns the same payoﬀ as that of cT+1 against cT). The
stability similar to (9) for the payoﬀ-equalizing (αT+2
T ,γT+2
T+1) is formulated as follows. (The Best
Reply Condition is derived in the same way as bimorphic NSD.)
In a neighborhood of (αT+2
T ,γT+2















T (α,γ) = αpT + (1 − α)γpT+1 + (1 − α)(1 − γ)pT+2.
Note that change in α does not aﬀect the relative share of cT+1 and cT+2-strategies, and thus
we require (13). Change in the share of cT+k (k ∈ {1,2}) aﬀects the relative share γ, and thus
we require (14).
It is probably not impossible to ﬁnd a suﬃcient condition on T to warrant the existence
of such (αT+2
T ,γT+2
T+1) for the trimorphic case, but it is also easy to see that as the number of
strategies in the support increases, the existence problem worsens because of more inequality
conditions to satisfy. Therefore we do not pursue it here. (However, in Figure 4 we give a
numerical example of a trimorphic NSD.)
A notable feature of trimorphic distributions is that the average payoﬀ of cT+1-strategy
under a trimorphic distribution with the support {cT,cT+1,cT+2} is strictly less than that of
cT+1 under a bimorphic distribution with the support {cT,cT+1}, since there is an exploiter
17cT+2-strategy. (See Figure 4.) This implies that if equilibrium αT+2
T exists, then it is larger than
the bimorphic equilibrium share αT+1
T . Thus, if exists, a trimorphic NSD is more eﬃcient than
the bimorphic NSD with the same shortest trust-building periods T.
It turns out that strategy distributions with inﬁnitely many trust-building strategies {cT,cT+1,
...} in the support are easier to analyze, since they require only one parameter to equalize the
payoﬀs. We ﬁrst prove that the distribution must be “geometric” to equalize the payoﬀs of all
strategies in {cT,cT+1, ...}.
Lemma 6. For any T < ∞, let p be a stationary strategy distribution with the support {cT,cT+1,
...}. If v(cT;p) = v(cT+k;p) for all k = 1,2,..., then there exists α ∈ (0,1) such that the fraction
of cT+k-strategy is of the form α(1 − α)k for each k = 0,1,2,....
Proof: See Appendix.
Denote the geometric distribution of {cT,cT+1,...} as p∞
T (α). We show that if p∞
T (α) is
the stationary strategy distribution in the matching pool, for any α, the average payoﬀ of cT-
strategy is greater than/equal to/less than that of cT+1-strategy if and only if the average payoﬀ
of cT+k-strategy is greater than/equal to/less than that of cT+k+1-strategy, for any k = 1,2,....
The intuition is as follows. The behavioral outcomes for cT+1-strategy after the second period
is essentially the same as those for cT-strategy from the ﬁrst period, i.e., T periods of trust-
building followed by permanent cooperation if the partner had the same strategy, while followed
by dissolution if the partner had a longer trust-building strategy. Similarly, the behavioral
outcomes for cT+2-strategy after the second period is essentially the same as those for cT+1-
strategy from the ﬁrst period.... Therefore, if cT has higher/the same/lower average payoﬀ than
cT+1-strategy does, so does cT+1 against cT+2 and so on.
Lemma 7. For any T < ∞ and any α ∈ (0,1), v(cT;p∞
T (α)) R v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)) if and only if
v(cT+k;p∞
T (α)) R v(cT+k+1;p∞
T (α)) for all k = 1,2,....
Proof: See Appendix.
A suﬃcient condition for one-step deviant mutants to be deterred is again the strict Best
Reply Condition, which is derived in the same way as the bimorphic case. Notice that for any
period after T, playing D (after the history consisting only of (D,D)) is an on-path action.
Hence the meaningful deviations are those that play D after the cooperation periods started
(that is, play D and keep the partnership for ﬁrst T +k periods, play C at least once, and then
play D if the partnership continued). Such one-shot deviation during the cooperation periods
cannot invade the distribution if the continuation value at T + k + 2 satisﬁes
g + (L − 1)v(cT+k;p∞
T (α)) <
c





T (α)) < vBR. (15)
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Figure 4: Bimorphic, Trimorphic, and Inﬁnite-support NSD
(g = 60,c = 55,d = 0,` = −1,δ = 0.95, and T = 0.)
It is also straightforward to see that mutants who choose diﬀerent continuation decision from
the incumbents cannot invade the distribution.
Finally, mutants with the same play path as one of the cT+k-strategies should be considered.
However, stability under a geometric distribution is diﬃcult to formulate, because change in the
fraction of one strategy aﬀects the relative share of many strategies. To simplify, we postulate
that if the distribution changes from a geometric one, there will be evolutionary pressure to
restore the distribution to another payoﬀ-equalizing geometric distribution in a rather short
time. Under this assumption, we show that there is a geometric distribution with α∞
T ∈ (0,1)
which is robust against small changes to another geometric distribution in the sense that there
is a neighborhood U of α∞
T such that for any α ∈ U and any k = 1,2,...,
α R α∞
T ⇐⇒ v(cT+k;p∞
T (α)) R v(cT;p∞
T (α)). (16)
The idea is that if mutants with the same play path as that of cT+k-strategy enter, the distri-
bution shifts to p∞
T (α) with α < α∞
T and (16) warrants that they will do worse than the earliest
cooperator cT-strategy, and vice versa.
By a slight abuse of our terminology, we call an inﬁnite-support distribution p a NSD if it
satisﬁes (15) and (16). Note that if there is α∞
T ∈ (0,1) that satisﬁes (16) for k = 1, then Lemma
7 warrants (16) for any k = 1,2,....
Similar to the trimorphic case, the payoﬀ of cT+1-strategy is lower under an inﬁnite-support
distribution than that under a bimorphic distribution, since there are exploiters of cT+1- strategy
(namely, cT+k-strategies with k = 2). See Figure 4. Therefore the inﬁnite-support NSD is more
eﬃcient than the bimorphic NSD with the same shortest trust-building period T.
19Proposition 4. For any δ > δ∗ there exists τ∞(δ) < τ(δ) such that for any T ∈ (τ∞(δ),τ(δ)),
there is a NSD of the form p∞
T (α∞
T ) for some α∞
T ∈ (0,1). Moreover,
v(cT;pT+1
T (αT+1
T )) < v(cT;p∞
T (α∞
T )),
i.e., the inﬁnite-support NSD is more eﬃcient than the bimorphic NSD with the same shortest
trust-building periods.
Proof: See Appendix.
In summary, diverse strategies in the support improves the equilibrium average payoﬀ. This
is because the share of cT-strategy (the earliest cooperators) must increase to restore the balance,
when there are more exploiters in the distribution.
4 Extensions
4.1 Eﬃciency Wage and Matching Mechanism
Our model describes a society where players meet a stranger to play a Voluntarily Separable
Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. We analyzed how continuous cooperation becomes an equilibrium
behavior when deviation from cooperation induces appropriate social sanctions.
Sanctions consist of two parts. First, a player’s defection invokes the partner’s severance
decision, forcing him to start a new partnership with a stranger. Second, the payoﬀ level he
expects with a stranger is less than what he expects in a continued partnership with the current
partner.
In the main text, we have identiﬁed two ways by which the payoﬀ diﬀerence is generated;
positive trust-building periods and exploitation by strategies with longer trust-building periods.
There is an additional mechanism that reduces payoﬀ after a break-up if we allow the match-
ing probability to be less than one: Even if cooperation can be established with a new partner
immediately, with a positive probability a player fails to ﬁnd a partner in the matching pool
(i.e., the player may become “unemployed”). This is the logic which provides a work incentive in
the eﬃciency wage theory since the possibility of unemployment works as a disciplinary device
(see, e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). For completeness of the paper we brieﬂy discuss how our
model can be extended to derive c0-strategy as a NSS when there is a positive unemployment
probability.
Suppose, in the matching pool, only with probability 1 − u ∈ (0,1) one can ﬁnd a new
partner and with probability u ∈ (0,1) he spends the next period without a partner and receives
a normalized payoﬀ of 0. With this possibility of “unemployment”, the average payoﬀ that
cT-strategy player expects to receive in the matching pool (but before he ﬁnds a partner) is:
v0(cT;pT,u) = (1 − u)v(cT;pT),
20where v(cT;pT) is now interpreted as “the average payoﬀ that cT expects to receive when a new
partnership is formed” (i.e., at the beginning of period 1 of a partnership).
By the same logic as in subsection 3.1, the Best Reply Condition is v0(cT;pT,u) 5 vBR.
Clearly, if (5) is satisﬁed, this Best Reply Condition is also satisﬁed. Moreover, it can be satisﬁed
even for c0 for suﬃciently large u, and cooperation without trust-building period becomes a self-
sustaining state.11
As noted in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Okuno-Fujiwara (1989), unemployment works
as a disciplinary device that deters moral hazard behavior. This observation suggests that the
matching mechanism is an important element in creating cooperative partnerships.
There are two ways to consider the details of matching mechanisms. One way is to distinguish
the reasons to be in the matching pool. In our setup, there are four reasons: new birth, death of
the partner, separation due to the partner’s deviation, and separation due to own deviation. In
this paper we analyzed the case where no distinction can be made among these due to the lack
of information. Higher eﬃciency is achieved if players can distinguish at least some reasons why
the newly matched partner came into the matching pool. (See Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 2007.)
Moreover, if players can ﬁnd matches via their social network, before going to the random
matching pool, further eﬃciency gain is expected since the deviation incentive is smaller within
one’s social network.
The other way is to ﬁnd mechanisms that generate suﬃcient matching friction as assumed in
the eﬃciency wage literature. Eeckhout (2006) shows that using personal characteristics (such
as skin color) as a correlation device is a way to generate the suﬃcient matching friction in a
monomorphic distribution.
4.2 Alternating-Action Equilibrium
If 2c < g + `, then repeating (C,C) is not the most eﬃcient outcome. Among pure strat-
egy distributions, it is most eﬃcient to alternate (C,D) and (D,C). By a similar logic to the
monomorphic equilibrium, the following two-strategy distribution constitutes a NSD for suﬃ-
ciently long trust-building periods.
Deﬁnition: For any T = 1,2,..., aT-strategy is deﬁned as follows.
t = 1,2,...,T: Play D and keep the partnership if and only if (D,D) is observed.
t = T + 1: Play C, keep the partnership regardless of the current observation, and move to
Alternating-action regime if the partner played D. Move to C-trigger regime if the partner
played C.
• Alternating-action regime: In periods t = T + k (k = 2) such that k is even, play D and keep
the partnership if and only if the partner played C in the current period. When k is odd, play
11Carmichael and MacLeod (1997) have essentially the same idea by gift-giving instead of unemployment.
21C and keep the partnership if and only if the partner played D.
• C-trigger regime: Play C and keep the partnership if and only if the partner played C in the
current period.
Deﬁnition: For any T = 1,2,..., bT-strategy is deﬁned as follows.
t = 1,2,...,T: Play D and keep the partnership if and only if (D,D) is observed.
t = T + 1: Play D, keep the partnership regardless of the current observation, and move to
Alternating-action regime if the partner played C. Move to C-trigger regime if the partner
played D.
• Alternating-action regime: In periods t = T + k (k = 2) such that k is even, play C and
keep the partnership if and only if the partner played D. When k is odd, play D and keep the
partnership if and only if the partner played C.
• C-trigger regime: Play C and keep the partnership if and only if the partner played C in the
current period.
If aT met aT, the play path is the same as cT meeting cT. If aT met bT, the play path
after T periods of trust-building alternates action proﬁles (C,D) and (D,C). If bT met bT, the
play path is the same as cT+1 meeting cT+1. Therefore if a stationary distribution of aT and
bT is stable, then a constant fraction of the population play the alternating action proﬁles after
certain periods of trust building.
There is no voluntary separation on the play path even though there are multiple strategies
in the society. Therefore the essential logic is the same as that of a monomorphic NSD. This
type of equilibrium can be interpreted as a “single-norm” equilibrium with coordinated action
proﬁles. The analysis will be useful for asymmetric stage games such as Hawk-Dove game, where
the eﬃcient outcome is a coordinated action proﬁle.
5 Conclusion and Related Literature
Several papers have previously analyzed voluntarily separable repeated games, though not as
fully as this paper does. We discuss two main points of our paper in relation to the literature:
the function of trust-building periods and the meaning of polymorphic equilibria.
First, the trust-building periods in our equilibria serve as a mechanism for sanction against
defection because they make the initial value of a new partnership small. In the literature,
the gift exchange of Carmichael and MacLeod (1997) and the gradual cooperation in Datta
(1996) and Kranton (1996a) have the same function. By contrast, the gradual cooperation
under incomplete information (Ghosh and Ray, 1996, and Kranton, 1996a) is to sort types out
and thus has a diﬀerent meaning.12
12Repeated games with a quitting option (Watson, 2002, Blonski and Probst, 2001, and Furusawa and
Kawakami, 2006) also display gradual cooperation to sort types.
22Our model is based on more basic primitives than these previous works: the game is of
complete information, the stage game is an ordinary prisoner’s dilemma with two actions, and
there is no gift exchange prior to the partnership. We show that it is still possible to construct
a punishment mechanism. Furthermore, we consider evolution of behaviors within a society
as a whole, rather than restricting attention to behaviors within a single partnership given a
(monomorphic) strategy distribution in the society. We are also able to provide fuller charac-
terizations of monomorphic trust-building strategy NSDs, such as identifying the condition (in
terms of the survival rate and payoﬀs of stage game) for the existence of a NSD with a particular
length of trust-building periods.
Eeckhout (2006) analyzes a very similar model to ours, except that his does not have a ran-
dom death and he does not consider evolutionary stability. Since the most eﬃcient monomorphic
equilibrium does not generically attain the constrained optimal payoﬀ vBR, Eeckhout (2006) in-
troduced a public randomization to improve the payoﬀs. By contrast, we noticed the nonlinearity
of payoﬀs under asymmetric strategy distributions and thus did not have to resort to correlated
strategies to improve the payoﬀs. In general, allowing correlated strategies requires the existence
of a public randomization device, which is an extra assumption to the model.
Second, the existence and higher eﬃciency of polymorphic equilibria than monomorphic
equilibria is a totally new result. The logic that early start of long-term cooperation is sustained
because of possible exploitation in a future partnership is similar to the equilibrium of Rob and
Yang (2005), written independently from our paper. In their model, there are three types of
players; a bad type who always plays D, a good type who always plays C, and the rational
type who tries to maximize their payoﬀ. Existence of bad type players makes it valuable to (1)
keep and cooperate with either good or rational type partners, and (2) to ﬁnd out bad type
partners as soon as possible. Thus, a rational player should cooperate from the beginning to be
distinguished from the bad-type.
Our result is much starker than Rob and Yang’s. Our model does not rely on heterogeneous
“type” and incomplete information. Instead, bad (longer trust-building) strategy emerges en-
dogenously as a polymorphic NSD. We also show that there are equilibria with a variety of (even
inﬁnitely many) heterogeneous strategies.
The higher eﬃciency of polymorphic equilibria is an interesting result. One might think
that late cooperators create unstable partnerships and thus reduce social welfare. However, in
equilibrium there should be enough early cooperators to help each other, and the beneﬁt of
partially early cooperation is greater than uniformly delayed cooperation.
236 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3: Let us rearrange v(cT;pT+1




αL(cT,cT)v(cT,cT) + (1 − α)L(cT,cT+1)v(cT,cT+1)
αL(cT,cT) + (1 − α)L(cT,cT+1)




αL(cT,cT) + (1 − α)L(cT,cT+1)
.
This is the only part that α is involved in v(cT;pT+1
T (α)). Thus
v(cT;pT+1






[L(cT,cT+1) + α{L(cT,cT) − L(cT,cT+1)}]2 > 0,
and, since L(cT,cT)−L(cT,cT+1) = 1
1−δ2 − 1−δ2(T+1)
1−δ2 > 0, the derivative is decreasing in α. Note
also that
v(cT,cT) − v(cT,cT+1)
= (1 − δ2T)d + δ2Tc −
(1 − δ2T)d + δ2T(1 − δ2)`
1 − δ2(T+1)
=
(1 − δ2T){1 − δ2(T+1) − 1}d + δ2T{(1 − δ2(T+1))c − (1 − δ2)`}
1 − δ2(T+1)
=
δ2T{(1 − δ2)(c − `) + δ2(1 − δ2T)(c − d)}
1 − δ2(T+1) > 0.
Hence v(cT,pT+1
T (α)) is strictly increasing and concave in α.
Proof of Lemma 4: By the same logic as Lemma 3, let
µT+1(α) :=
αL(cT+1,cT)




T (α)) = v(cT+1,cT+1) + µT+1(α){v(cT+1,cT) − v(cT+1,cT+1)}. (18)












(1 − δ2)(g − c) − δ2(1 − δ2T)(c − d)
i
= 0, (19)
24if T 5 τ(δ). (This fact will be useful in Proposition 3 as well.) Hence
v(cT+1,cT) − v(cT+1,cT+1)
= {v(cT+1,cT) − v(cT,cT)} + {v(cT,cT) − v(cT+1,cT+1)} > 0, (20)






[L(cT+1,cT+1) + α{L(cT+1,cT) − L(cT+1,cT+1)}]2 > 0.
However, notice that L(cT+1,cT) − L(cT+1,cT+1) = 1−δ2(T+1)
1−δ2 − 1
1−δ2 < 0 so that the derivative
is increasing in α. Therefore v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)) is strictly increasing but convex in α.















[αL(cT,cT) + (1 − α)L(cT,cT+1)]2 →
L(cT,cT+1)
L(cT,cT)














At δ = δ(T),
v(cT;pT+1
T (1)) = v(cT,cT) = v(cT+1;pT+1
T (1)) = v(cT+1,cT).





















= (1 − δ2(T+1))
δ2T(1 − δ2)(g − `)
1 − δ2(T+1) −
1
1 − δ2(T+1)δ2T(1 − δ2)(c − d)
= δ2T(1 − δ2)
n





Proof of Proposition 3: We introduce a useful notation ﬁrst. For any T,T0 ∈ N, deﬁne
Γ(cT,cT0) := L(cT,cT0){v(cT,cT0) − vBR}.
25Then for any T,T0 ∈ N such that T,T0 = 1,
Γ(cT,cT0) = V (cT,cT0) − L(cT,cT0)vBR
= d + δ2V (cT−1,cT0−1) − {1 + δ2L(cT−1,cT0−1)}vBR
= d − vBR + δ2Γ(cT−1,cT0−1). (21)
Lemma 8. For any T,T0 ∈ N, Γ(cT,cT) = Γ(cT+1,cT).








1 − δ2 − g.
Hence we have that
[L(c0,c0) − L(c1,c0)]vBR = L(c0,c0)v(c0,c0) − v(c1,c0)L(c1,c0).
That is,
Γ(c0,c0) = Γ(c1,c0).
Next suppose that Γ(cT−1,cT−1) = Γ(cT,cT−1) holds. From (21),
Γ(cT,cT) = d − vBR + Γ(cT−1,cT−1)
= d − vBR + Γ(cT,cT−1)
= Γ(cT+1,cT).
Lemma 9. For any δ > δ∗, there exists τ2(δ) < τ(δ) such that for any T ∈ (τ2(δ),τ(δ)), there
are two solutions in (0,1) to
v(cT;pT+1
T (α)) = v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)).
Proof of Lemma 9: By the deﬁnition, at T = τ(δ),
v(cT;pT+1
T (1)) = v(cT+1;pT+1
T (1)).
Note also that for any T,
v(cT;pT+1
T (0)) = v(cT,cT+1) < v(cT+1,cT+1) = v(cT+1;pT+1
T (0)).
Recall that the average payoﬀ of cT is concave in α (Lemma 3), that of cT+1 is convex in α
(Lemma 4), and δ > δ∗ warrants that the slope of the average payoﬀ of cT+1 is steeper than
that of cT-strategy at α = 1. Hence there are two intersections of the average payoﬀ functions
when T = τ(δ); one at α = 1 and one within (0,1). (See Figure 2.)
26From (19) we have that, for T < τ(δ),
v(cT;pT+1
T (1)) = v(cT,cT) < v(cT+1,cT) = v(cT+1;pT+1
T (1)),
but the slope of the average payoﬀ of cT+1 is still steeper than that of cT-strategy at α = 1.
Therefore, by the continuity of the average payoﬀ functions with respect to T, for T suﬃciently
close to τ(δ), there are two intersections of the average payoﬀ functions in (0,1).
Let the larger solution be αT+1
T . At αT+1
T , the average value of cT+1 intersects with that of




T (α)) R v(cT;pT+1
T (α)).
To complete the proof of Proposition, we show that The Best Reply Condition is satisﬁed




T+1(vBR) be the fractions of cT-strategy which solve v(cT;pT+1
T (α)) =
vBR and v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)) = vBR respectively. By the continuity of the average payoﬀ functions





T (α)) = vBR is equivalent to
L(cT;pT+1
T (α)){v(cT;pT+1
T (α)) − vBR} = 0
⇐⇒ V (cT;pT+1
T (α)) − L(cT;pT+1
T (α))vBR = 0
⇐⇒ αL(cT,cT)v(cT,cT) + (1 − α)L(cT,cT+1)v(cT,cT+1) − L(cT;pT+1
T (α))vBR = 0
⇐⇒ αΓ(cT,cT) + (1 − α)Γ(cT,cT+1) = 0.
Therefore, α∗
T(vBR) is the solution to
H∗
T(α) := αΓ(cT,cT) + (1 − α)Γ(cT,cT+1) = 0. (22)
Similarly, α∗
T+1(vBR) is the solution to
H∗
T+1(α) := αΓ(cT+1,cT) + (1 − α)Γ(cT+1,cT+1) = 0. (23)
By Lemma 8, H∗
T(1) = Γ(cT,cT) = Γ(cT+1,cT) = H∗
















BR) also holds when the smaller solution α to v(cT;p
T+1
T (α)) = v(cT+1;p
T+1
T (α)) has the
average payoﬀ greater than v
BR. However, when T = τ(δ), v(cT;p
T+1
T (α)) < v
BR. Therefore for T suﬃciently
close to τ(δ), it cannot be that v(cT;p
T+1











1 − δ2 d + δ2T` −
1 − δ2(T+1)






= δ2T(1 − δ2)(d − `) + δ2(T+1)(c − vBR) = δ2T(1 − δ2)(d − ` + g − c) > 0. (24)
Therefore the slope of H∗
T is steeper than that of H∗
T+1 for any α. This implies that H∗
T(α) <
H∗




This completes the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 6: Consider ct-strategy for an arbitrary t ∈ {T,T + 1,T + 2,...} and the
beginning of period t + 1 in a match, when ct-strategy is about to start cooperation. (That is,
the partnership has continued up to t + 1-th period so that the possibility that the partner has
a shorter trust-building than t is excluded.)
Let αt be the conditional probability that the partner is the same strategy. The conditional
probability is 1 − αt that the partner has a longer trust-building period. The (non-averaged)
continuation payoﬀ of ct-strategy at the beginning of t + 1 is
V (ct;p,t + 1) = αt{
c
1 − δ2 +
δ(1 − δ)
1 − δ2 V (ct;p)} + (1 − αt){` + δV (ct;p)}. (25)
On the other hand, the continuation payoﬀ of ct+1-strategy is
V (ct+1;p,t + 1) = αt{g + δV (ct+1;p)}
+(1 − αt){d + δ(1 − δ)V (ct+1;p) + δ2V (ct+1;p,t + 2)}. (26)
Notice that the payoﬀ structure for ct+1-strategy at the beginning of period t + 2 when it
just ﬁnished the trust building is the same as that of ct-strategy at t + 1, i.e.,
V (ct+1;p,t + 2) = V (ct;p,t + 1).
Therefore (26) becomes
V (ct+1;p,t + 1) = αt{g + δV (ct+1;p)}
+(1 − αt){d + δ(1 − δ)V (ct+1;p) + δ2V (ct;p,t + 1)}
⇐⇒ V (ct+1;p,t + 1) =
1
1 − (1 − αt)δ2
£
αt{g + δV (ct+1;p)}
+(1 − αt){d + δ(1 − δ)V (ct+1;p)}
¤
. (27)
28From the assumption that the average payoﬀs of ct and ct+1 are the same,
V (ct;p) = V (ct+1;p). (28)
Then, since the payoﬀ until t is the same for both ct and ct+1, we also have
V (ct;p,t + 1) = V (ct+1;p,t + 1). (29)
(29) implies that the RHS of (25) and (27) must be the same. Using (28) and letting V ∗(p) =
V (ct;p) = V (ct+1;p), αt must satisfy
αt{
c
1 − δ2 +
δ(1 − δ)
1 − δ2 V ∗(p)} + (1 − αt){` + δV ∗(p)}
=
αt{g + δV ∗(p)} + (1 − αt){d + δ(1 − δ)V ∗(p)}
1 − (1 − αt)δ2 .
Since this equation does not depend on t, we have established that αt = α for all t = T,T +1,...,
i.e., the fraction of cT+k-strategy is of the form α(1 − α)k.
Proof of Lemma 7: For any T,T0 < ∞, α ∈ [0,1] and v ∈ <, deﬁne
ˆ Γ(cT,cT0,v) := L(cT,cT0){v(cT,cT0) − v};
ˆ Γ(cT,p∞
T (α),v) := L(cT;p∞
T (α)){v(cT;p∞




T (α)) − v}
= αL(cT,cT)v(cT,cT) + (1 − α)L(cT,cT+1)v(cT,cT+1) − {αL(cT,cT) + (1 − α)L(cT,cT+1)}v




T (α)) − v}
= αˆ Γ(cT+1,cT,v) + (1 − α){αˆ Γ(cT+1,cT+1,v) + (1 − α)ˆ Γ(cT+1,cT+2,v)}; (31)
and L(cT+2;p∞
T (α)){v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)) − v}
= αˆ Γ(cT+2,cT,v) + (1 − α)[αˆ Γ(cT+2,cT+1,v)
+(1 − α){αˆ Γ(cT+2,cT+2,v) + (1 − α)ˆ Γ(cT+2,cT+3,v)}], (32)
and so on. Note that by a generalization of (21), for any T,T0 and v ∈ <,




T (α)) − v}
= αˆ Γ(cT+1,cT,v) + (1 − α)[d − v + δ2{αˆ Γ(cT,cT,v) + (1 − α)ˆ Γ(cT,cT+1,v)}]
= αˆ Γ(cT+1,cT,v) + (1 − α)[d − v + δ2ˆ Γ(cT,p∞
T ,v)]. (33)




T (α)) − v}
= αˆ Γ(cT+1,cT,v) + (1 − α)
£




Subtracting (33) from (34), we get
ˆ Γ(cT+2,p∞
T (α),v) − ˆ Γ(cT+1,p∞
T (α),v) = (1 − α)δ2©ˆ Γ(cT+1,p∞




Let v = v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)). Then ˆ Γ(cT+1,p∞
T (α),v) = 0 so that (35) is equivalent to
L(cT+2;p∞
T (α)){v(cT+2;p∞
T (α)) − v(cT+1;p∞
T (α))}
= −(1 − α)δ2L(cT;p∞
T (α)){v(cT;p∞
T (α)) − v(cT+1;p∞
T (α))}.
Therefore, for any α ∈ (0,1),
v(cT;p∞
T (α)) R v(cT+1;p∞
T (α))
⇐⇒ v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)) R v(cT+2;p∞
T (α)).
This argument can be continued for any cT+k-strategy.
Proof of Proposition 4: We ﬁrst prove the Stable Payoﬀ Equalization and local stability of
cT and cT+1-strategy, which also implies that all strategies in the support have the same average
payoﬀ and satisfy the stability by Lemma 7.
Lemma 10. For any δ > δ∗, there exists τE
∞(δ) < τ(δ) such that for any T ∈ (τE
∞(δ),τ(δ)),
there exists α∞
T (δ) ∈ (0,1) such that
α R α∞
T ⇐⇒ v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)) R v(cT;p∞
T (α)). (36)
Proof of Lemma 10: We use a similar logic to the one for the existence of bimorphic NSD,
although the average payoﬀ of cT+1-strategy is no longer convex. First, notice that for any T,α,
v(cT;pT+1
T (α)) = v(cT;p∞
T (α)).
30The average payoﬀ of cT+1 can be decomposed as follows.
v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)) = µ10(α)v(cT+1,cT) + µ11(α)v(cT+1,cT+1) + {1 − µ10(α) − µ11(α)}v(cT+1,cT+2)

































α2{L(cT+1,cT+2) − L(cT+1,cT)} + (1 − 2α)L(cT+1,cT+2)
i
.


















































Moreover, at T = τ(δ),
v(cT+1;p∞
T (1)) = v(cT;p∞
T (1)),
and for any T < τ(δ),
v(cT+1;p∞
T (1)) = v(cT+1,cT) > v(cT,cT) = v(cT;p∞
T (1)).
Thus, by continuity of the average payoﬀ with respect to T, for T suﬃciently close to τ(δ),
v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)) crosses with v(cT;p∞
T (α)) from below, i.e., (36) holds.
Next, we show the Best Reply condition with strict inequality.
31Lemma 11. For any δ > δ∗ there exists τ∞(δ) ∈ [τE
∞(δ),τ(δ)) such that for any T ∈ (τ∞(δ),τ(δ)),
v(cT;p∞
T (α∞
T (δ))) < vBR.
Proof of Lemma 11: Recall that α∗
T(vBR) is deﬁned by
v(cT;pT+1
T (α)) = vBR,
Deﬁne α∞
T+1(vBR) implicitly by v(cT+1;p∞





T(vBR) is the (unique) solution to
H∗
T(α) := αΓ(cT,cT) + (1 − α)Γ(cT,cT+1) = 0. (37)
By the same logic, α∞
T+1(vBR) is a solution to
F(α) := αΓ(cT+1,cT) + (1 − α)αΓ(cT+1,cT+1) + (1 − α)2Γ(cT+1,cT+2) = 0. (38)
By computation,
F(1) = Γ(cT+1,cT) = Γ(cT,cT), from Lemma 8,
F0(α) = Γ(cT,cT) + Γ(cT+1,cT+1) − 2Γ(cT+1,cT+2) − 2α{Γ(cT+1,cT+1) − Γ(cT+1,cT+2)},
F0(0) = Γ(cT,cT) + Γ(cT+1,cT+1) − 2Γ(cT+1,cT+2) > 0,
(since Γ(cT,cT) > Γ(cT+1,cT+1) > Γ(cT+1,cT+2))
F0(1) = Γ(cT,cT) − Γ(cT+1,cT+1) > 0.
Hence F is a strictly increasing, concave function for α ∈ [0,1] and F(α) = 0 has a unique
solution in [0,1]. Note also that H∗
T(0) = Γ(cT,cT+1) and H∗
T(1) = Γ(cT,cT) = F(1).
Since H∗
T is linear in α and F is concave, if the slope of H∗
T at α = 1 is steeper than the
slope of F at α = 1, then for T close to but less than τ(δ), H∗
T intersects with the horizontal
axis at a larger α than F does.14 (See Figure 5.)
In fact, F0(1) = Γ(cT,cT)−Γ(cT+1,cT+1) < Γ(cT,cT)−Γ(cT,cT+1) = H∗0
T (1) since Γ(cT+1,cT+1) >
Γ(cT,cT+1) from (24). Therefore, for T suﬃciently close to τ(δ) (and not less than τE
∞(δ) so
that α∞
T (δ) exists), α∞
T+1(vBR) < α∗
T(vBR).
Lemma 12. The average payoﬀ of cT+1-strategy under p∞
T (α) is lower than the one under
pT+1
T (α) when v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)) 5 vBR.
14For δ > δ
∗, H
∗
T(0) = Γ(cT,cT+1) > Γ(cT+1,cT+2) = F(0). Thus H
∗
T is not uniformly below F.
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Figure 5: Proof of α∞
T+1(vBR) < α∗
T(vBR) for T suﬃciently close to τ(δ)
Proof of Lemma 12: For any T ∈ N and any (α,v) ∈ (0,1) × <, deﬁne
ˆ Γ(cT+1,pT+1
T (α),v) := L(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)){v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)) − v}
= αΓ(cT+1,cT) + (1 − α)Γ(cT+1,cT+1)
{αL(cT+1,cT) + (1 − α)L(cT+1,cT+1)}(vBR − v).
Recall also
ˆ Γ(cT+1,p∞
T (α),v) := L(cT+1;p∞
T (α)){v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)) − v}
= αΓ(cT+1,cT) + (1 − α)αΓ(cT+1,cT+1) + (1 − α)2Γ(cT+1,cT+2)
+
n
αL(cT+1,cT) + (1 − α)αL(cT+1,cT+1)
+(1 − α)2L(cT+1,cT+2)
o
(vBR − v). (39)
By computation, for any T,
{Γ(cT+1,cT+1) − Γ(cT+1,cT+2)}(1 − δ2) = δ2(T+1){δ2(c − vBR) + (1 − δ2)(c − `)} > 0.
Then for any α ∈ (0,1) and any v 5 vBR,
ˆ Γ(cT+1,pT+1
T (α),v) − ˆ Γ(cT+1,p∞
T (α),v) = (1 − α)2[Γ(cT+1,cT+1) − Γ(cT+1,cT+2)




T (α)) − v} − {v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)) − v}]
= ˆ Γ(cT+1,pT+1
T (α),v) − ˆ Γ(cT+1,p∞
T (α),v)
−{L(cT+1;pT+1
T (α) − L(cT+1;p∞
T (α))}{v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)) − v}.
33Note also L(cT+1;pT+1
T (α))−L(cT+1;p∞
T (α)) = (1−α)2{L(cT,cT)−L(cT+1,cT+2)} > 0. There-
fore,
v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)) 5 vBR ⇒ v(cT+1;pT+1
T (α)) > v(cT+1;p∞
T (α)).
Lemma 12 implies that the inﬁnite-support NSD is more eﬃcient than the bimorphic NSD.
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
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